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Abstract 
 
In this study we examine the connection between the varied experiences of the transition 
countries in attracting FDI and their diverse experiences in transforming their tax structures to be 
consistent with a market economy.  In particular, we study whether complexity and uncertainty 
in their tax laws have deterred foreign direct investment by increasing transaction costs, the 
compliance burden and the unpredictability of tax liabilities.  Our results indicate that complexity 
and uncertainty, in the sense of multiple tax rates, indeterminate language in the tax law, and 
inconsistent changes in the tax laws have a significant negative effect on inward foreign direct 
investment.   
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Tax Structures and FDI 
The Deterrent Effects of Complexity and Uncertainty 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
  The countries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe (FSU and ECE), 
in their attempt to rapidly transition to a market economy, have made substantial changes in their 
tax structures to bring them into conformance with the needs of a market economy.  With their 
growing understanding of the functioning of a market economy and the necessity to jettison a tax 
system that served very different goals, these countries have experimented greatly with their tax 
systems in the years since the beginning of transition. These efforts have resulted in frequent 
changes in tax law. They have also resulted in complaints by the business community that tax 
laws are complex and that tax liabilities are uncertain. 
  The purpose of this paper is twofold. The first objective is to record some of the dynamics 
of the tax reform process in transition economies using information from a special tablature of 
tax laws published by the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation. Although this annual 
publication was issued only for the years from 1993 to1998 it offers unique opportunities for 
examining those tax structures during this important period.  
  The second objective of the paper is to examine empirically whether complexity and 
uncertainty in tax laws negatively affect the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to these 
countries. Previous studies of the transition countries have indicated that complex laws and 
frequently changing tax legislation are a major obstacle to doing business (see OECD, 1995).  
While the evidence presented in these studies is itself interesting and insightful, it suffers from a 
selection bias problem in that the results are obtained from surveys of firms that already operate 
in those countries.  Clearly, these firms have managed to overcome problems with the tax law. 
However, such studies cannot discern whether complex legislation actually deterred others from 
investing. We add to the literature in several ways. First, we design a set of explicit measures of  3 
 
tax complexity and tax uncertainty. We then test empirically their effects on flows of foreign 
capital across the transition economies. 
  We contribute further by examining a concrete mechanism through which institutions can 
affect business decisions. While the literature on economic transition often stresses the 
importance of institutions and a functioning government to support the development of market 
structures in these economies (EBRD, 1999, Bevan and Estrin, 2001, Meyer, 2001), few studies 
have examined specific institutions to determine their relative importance to economic activity.
1 
Our contribution in this respect is that we isolate the effect of a particular aspect of the 
institutional framework – the tax structure
2. Our results suggest that features such as a large 
number of special tax rates for various economic activities, the use of ambiguous language in the 
laws, and frequent and inconsistent changes in tax laws have a deterring effect on FDI.   
  The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we explain the conceptual 
relationship between tax complexity, uncertainty and investment. In section 3 we present our 
measures of complexity and uncertainty, including tables showing the variety of experiences in 
tax policy in these countries. Foreign direct investment data and a set of control variables are 
presented in section 4 and a discussion of our empirical results follows in section 5. The final 
section offers concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Uncertainty, Complexity, and Investment Decisions 
The design of the tax structure and the way in which it changes over time can critically 
affect the level of risk and transaction costs associated with investment.
3 In this section we first 
                                                 
1 Holland and Pain (1998) study the effect of the mode of privatization on FDI. Ramcharran (2000) studies the 
effects of Bilateral Investment Treaties and competition laws on FDI. 
2 We differentiate between the direct effects of the level of taxes and the institutional effects of the design of the tax 
structure. 
3 Moreover, to the extent that complexity imposes a burdensome administrative cost on the taxing authority, tax 
rates will have to be higher than that necessary to raise an equivalent amount of revenue under an alternative, less 
complex system.  4 
 
discuss a variety of costs associated with complex tax legislation. We then discuss a number of 
ways in which uncertainty over tax liabilities may arise, including as a result of tax complexity 
itself. 
2.1  Costs of Complexity in the Tax Structure 
Complex tax legislation, usually associated with the number of tax rates, tax bases and 
the number of special provision it includes, directly imposes transaction costs on a firm, reducing 
the return on any given investment (Warskett, et al, 1998). Complexity is costly because firms 
must seek both to understand the tax law as it applies to their activities and to fulfill the 
requirements necessary for them to remain in compliance.  The greater the number of provisions 
in the tax code, the more time must be devoted to discerning which provisions are applicable to a 
particular activity.  Although the initial reading and comprehension of the law imposes only a 
one-time cost to the firm for any particular activity, shifting policy priorities lead to frequent 
changes in tax laws, and the firm must continually reassess the law to determine how its various 
activities are affected.    
Directly measuring the cost of assessing tax law is difficult, but there is ample evidence 
of the high cost incurred in order to remain in compliance with the tax system.  Calculating tax 
liabilities, completing requisite forms, maintaining records and providing documentation all 
contribute to what is termed the compliance burden.  Estimates of these costs indicate they can 
be quite high.  For example, compliance costs for combined U.S. federal and state corporate 
income tax are estimated at over three percent of revenues collected (Slemrod and Blumenthal, 
1996).  Evidence from other countries puts estimates in the range of 2 – 24 percent of total 
collections (Alm, 1996; Blumenthal and Slemrod, 1992).
4  Similar systematic estimates are not 
available for transition economies, but anecdotal evidence suggests that compliance burden can 
be substantial. For example, the reporting requirements of the Russian tax system are so 
demanding that even small firms are obligated to employ a full-time accountant in order to 
                                                 
4 For Great Britain / United Kingdom, see Sanford (1973, 1995) and Sanford, Godwin, and Hardwick (1989).  For 
Australia, see Fayle and Pope (1990).  For Canada, see Vaillancourt (1989).   5 
 
remain in compliance (Mudd, 1996).  
In addition, tax complexity may hinder investors indirectly via fiscal illusion, or a 
misperception on the part of the taxpayer of the true amount of taxes paid (Wagner, 1976).  
Analogous to the problem of investment under uncertainty, the informational cost associated 
with increased complexity in the tax system will, on the margin, discourage taxpayers from 
informing themselves (Heyndels and Smolders, 1995). 
 
2.2  Sources of Uncertainty in the Tax Structure 
    Another aspect of tax structures that may impact FDI decisions is uncertainty.  
Uncertainty affects business decisions because firms and individuals prefer less risk for any 
given expected return (see Hassett and Hubbard, 1997; Dotsey, 1990; Bizer and Judd, 1989; 
Hassett and Metcalf, 1999; and Edmiston, 2001). Given a firm’s business activities in a given 
period, uncertainty about its tax liability may arise for a number of reasons.  
    First, frequent changes in tax law can generate uncertainty about the return on an 
investment in future periods. Ample examples of government capriciousness in the tax treatment 
of firms are available to support doubts of government credibility in maintaining any given tax 
policy.  This problem is especially pervasive in countries of the FSU and ECE, as evidenced by a 
report from the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (1994, 8-9):  
 
  “The Russian tax regime has changed continuously over the past four years through the 
adoption of laws creating new types of taxes, the issuance of Presidential Decrees on taxation and 
varying interpretations of these laws and decrees by the Ministry of Finance and the State Tax 
Inspectorate.  These changes have taken place repeatedly and radically, generally with no warning 
or reference to policy decisions, and often retroactively.  If prior beneficial laws have been ignored 
or changed without provision for those who have made economic decisions based on those laws, 
then potential investors know that they must deal with an uncertain future and that no assumptions 
regarding taxation are sufficiently credible for analyzing the economics of proposed Russian 
projects.  Investment projects which make sense under one tax regime obviously can become 
unprofitable or even unworkable when the tax law suddenly changes.  This considerably increases 
the risk of making an investment.”
 5 
                                                 
5 Uncertainty may also be connected with the likelihood of known draft tax legislation being passed.  For example, 
the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance has designated a Deputy Minister to develop a new tax code since 1994. 
The tax code was officially presented in 1996 but a draft still had not been passed by the legislature by mid-2001.  6 
 
  Second, the current written laws and procedures themselves can be a source of uncertainty.  
In its study of taxation and foreign direct investment in the transition economies, the OECD 
found many instances in which the law “was seen as imprecise and vague . . . [p]rofessional 
advisors found it difficult to provide confident interpretations of the law (OECD, 1995, 22).”
6 
Often, the language itself is confusing. 
  Third, complexity itself may generate uncertainty because it can hinder discernment of the 
meaning of the law. In fact, tax law can be so complex and its evolution so disjointed, that, as the 
American Chamber of Commerce in Russia report noted above, provisions can be enacted that 
conflict with existing legislation. This last problem, along with the uncertainty due to imprecise 
language or conflicting provisions, is compounded in the environment of the transition 
economies in which tax administration bureaucracies are new, instructions are still under 
development, and there is a lack of precedence in a nascent court system (See Schaffer and 
Turley, 2001; Bevan, Estrin and Meyer, 2000).  
 
3.  Empirical Measures of Tax Complexity and Tax Uncertainty  
Information on the tax laws of the countries under study was obtained from the Central 
and East European Tax Directory published by the International Bureau on Fiscal 
Documentation (IBFD).  The publication is suitable for the purposes of this paper for three 
reasons.  First, it offers substantial information on various features of the tax system relating to 
corporate profits taxes, including tax bases, tax rates and special provisions.  Second, it uses a 
common format of tables and language for all countries and all years allowing direct 
comparisons of laws between countries and within countries over time.  Third, it includes all 24 
transition countries in ECE and the FSU.  A limitation of this source is that in 1999 the format 
was altered and several countries were dropped from the sample. For this reason, we restrict the 
                                                 
6 Even if there is certainty in the tax legislation, uncertainty may arise from unpredictable application of tax rules by 
tax officials, especially in developing countries (Alm, 1996; Bagchi et al., 1995; Mayshar, 1991). It has become a 
common practice for multinational firms to negotiate the terms, including tax policy terms, under which they will 
begin operations in the host country (see e.g., Edmiston et al., 2001).  7 
 
period under study to 1993-1998.
7  Nevertheless, this period is interesting as it contains some of 
the very early efforts in reform of the tax system, a process which is still ongoing (see Martinez-
Vasquez and McNab, 2001, for an overview of tax reforms in transition countries). 
According to Warskett, et al (1998, 123), "the complexity of a tax system is usually 
associated with the numbers of tax rates, tax bases and special provisions it includes." In the 
spirit of this definition, we derive three proxies based on various features of the published laws 
as described in the IBFD publications.  Two additional proxies for tax uncertainty are derived by 
examining how tax structures changed over time. The derivation of these five measures as well 
as tables depicting their dynamics, are discussed below. 
3.1    Measure 1 (Rates): Number of different tax rates 
Our first measure of complexity consists of a count of the number of different tax rates 
listed in the profits tax legislation.  The key complexity issue is the difficulty in determining the 
bases to which these special rates apply, especially when a single activity or portion of an 
activity may be reasonably assigned to more than one base. Some examples of activities subject 
to different rates indicate the potential for ambiguity: finance and insurance, agriculture, auctions 
and leasing, offshore activities, joint ventures with greater than 30% foreign participation, firms 
for which income from land is the major source of income, catering, video rental, and special 
economic zones.  
As Table 1 shows, there was substantial variation across countries in the number of 
special tax rates.  Some of the republics of the former Soviet Union had on average three or more 
special tax rates.  Other countries, such as Slovenia, Poland, Macedonia, and Croatia did not 
have any.  A comparison of 1993 and 1998 suggests that there was a general tendency to reduce 
the number of special tax rates.  Nevertheless some countries, for example Belarus, Romania, 
and the Russian Federation, increased the number of special tax rates during the period.    
                                                 
7 A panel of 24 countries over the 1993 – 1998 period provides 144 observations.  Because we have missing data for 
some countries for some years, our regressions, discussed below, have between 120 and 131 observations.   8 
 
 
3.2    Measure 2 (Lines): Number of lines in the description of the tax base 
    The IBFD maintained both a consistent table format and, seemingly, the same level of 
detail in their description of tax laws throughout the period.  Comparison of the number of lines 
across time and across countries may be a good indicator of the level of complexity in tax law.
8  
Our second measure of complexity consists of an annual count of the number of lines listed in 
the IBFD’s description of the profits tax base.  A greater number of lines may be associated with 
a greater number of special provisions, conditions, restrictions, etc. which firms must assess in 
order to determine their tax liability.  Inclusion of such provisions raises the transaction cost to 
businesses and may introduce additional uncertainty.  However, these is some ambiguity in this 
measure as additional lines might also indicate greater precision for determining tax liability 
rather than increased complexity.  More precision can lower both the transaction cost associated 
with interpreting tax law and the uncertainty over computing the tax liability of a given activity. 
We will return to this issue in the empirical section. 
Table 2 shows the substantial variation among countries in the IBFD’s descriptions of 
their profits tax law.  Some countries, such as Hungary, Russia, Bulgaria, and the Czech 
Republic, have a lengthy tax base description (12-16 lines) while others, such as Albania and 
Slovenia, have shorter ones (6-7 lines).  The general tendency across countries has been to 
increase the level of detail in the tax base.  
  
3.3    Measure 3 (Vague): Presence of indefinite phrases 
Many times the legislated eligibility criteria for use of particular tax rates, tax base or tax 
incentives are not sufficiently precise to allow firms to accurately predict their eligibility.  For 
example, some descriptions of the legislation contain such vague phrases as “donations to 
approved charities and other institutions” are tax deductible (Armenia) or that “Special 
                                                 
8 Although the authors of the separate tables for each country may vary, the strict format of the tablature helps lessen 
any variation due to differences in their diligence.  9 
 
incentives may be granted by the government to encourage reconstruction and development” 
(Croatia).  Our third measure tries to capture such ambiguity in the language of the law.  We 
create a variable which takes four possible values: 0 if there are no indefinite phrases in the 
definition of the tax base or in the description of special provisions: 1 if the language is definitely 
characterized by ambiguity: the values 0.3 and 0.7 are assigned to capture intermediate cases.  
Clearly, this is a subjective exercise but we have attempted to apply the same criteria for each 
country.    
  As Table 2 shows, the description of the law in Slovenia and Poland presented few 
ambiguities while in Russia, Moldova and several other countries, the level of indefiniteness has 
been high throughout the period.  The general tendency has been to reduce ambiguities, but 
clearly the experience varies across countries. 
 
3.4    Measure 4 (Chgs): Number of change in tax parameters. 
Frequent changes in tax parameters add uncertainty to tax planning.  They may indicate 
that further changes are in store because of continuing shifts in priorities, they may represent 
attempts to close loop holes, or they may indicate a practice of enacting unsustainable tax 
legislation.  One way to capture such changes is by counting the number of changes that 
occurred regarding the tax rate.  In particular, the fourth measure we use is the sum of changes in 
the highest marginal tax rate and changes in the number of different tax rates in a country over 
the period.   
Table 1 shows that along with changes in the number of special tax rates (column 9), 
there were significant changes with the highest statutory marginal tax rate (column 5).  The 
general tendency across countries has been to lower that rate, from 33 percent in 1993 to 
29 percent in 1998.  In some countries, e.g., Slovakia and Romania, the rates have remained 
fairly high compared to other countries.  In other countries such as Bulgaria and Hungary, the 
rate has declined substantially.  Yet in other countries, like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan the rate has 
changed in opposing directions.     10 
 
We should point out that the number of changes in tax rates may be an inexact measure 
of uncertainty because some changes may be announced and credible and therefore would not 
contribute to uncertainty (see Auerbach and Hines, 1987, 1988).  Table 1 indicates, for example, 
that Poland went through two changes in its tax rates over the period.  However, Poland had 
committed to decreasing the profits tax rate by 2 percentage points every year until 2000 to reach 
a rate of 32% and, thus, its changes were predictable. 
 
3.5    Measure 5 (Oppchgs): Number of changes in tax parameters in opposing directions. 
Perhaps a better indicator of tax uncertainty is derived from tracking changes in tax law 
in opposing directions.  Such inconsistency will reduce confidence in the directions that future 
changes in tax legislation are expected to take.  Our final proxy counts the number of changes in 
opposing directions both of the highest marginal rate and number of separate rates in the profits 
tax legislation. 
 
4.  FDI and Tax Structure: Econometric Specification.  
  Our dependent variable for the empirical estimation is FDI as a percent of GDP. The source 
for this and many of the economic control variables discussed below is Transition Report, 
published by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). This publication 
offers a data set for transition economies which makes all data directly comparable to the extent 
that is possible.  Often, data on the same series differ substantially depending on the reporting 
institution.  For example, FDI data can be affected by decisions of a country’s government on 
accounting rules for inventory and depreciation, on the recording institutions treatment of work 
in progress, distinctions between capital alteration and maintenance, etc.  We try to minimize 
such problems by utilizing single sources for all observations. Table 3 shows FDI inflows in the 
countries in the sample during 1993-1998.  The general trend has been towards greater inflows of 
FDI.  Some countries, like Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Azerbaijan have received  11 
 
substantial amounts while others such as Russia, Uzbekistan, and Belarus have received 
substantially less. 
  Although our key independent variables are the measures described in the preceding 
section, we include a number of “control” variables reflecting the determinants of FDI suggested 
in the literature (see Thorton and Mikheeva, 1996; Kushnirsky, 2001; Bevan and Estrin, 2001; 
Meyer, 2001). For some of the countries in the region, the oil and gas sector has been a 
significant attraction to resource-seeking investments resulting in large inward capital flows. For 
this reason, we construct the dummy variable Gas, which takes the value of 1 if a country has 
substantial reserves of natural gas and oil, zero otherwise. We also include the rate of economic 
growth, a dummy variable for geographic proximity to countries of the European Union (EU), 
and openness as measured by trade volume over GDP all of which are expected to have a 
positive effect on FDI.  
  Research suggests that capital inflows into transition countries are affected by success in 
the process of transition. We include in the model the variable Transition, a principal component 
of eight indexes compiled by the EBRD to track the success in transition in the 24 countries we 
study. The indexes cover success with privatization, price and trade liberalization, financial 
sector development, and government policy and offer a broad measure of economic and 
institutional reform. We also control for macroeconomic stability proxied by the log of the 
annual CPI inflation and the rate of exchange rate depreciation. 
  We include the highest statutory marginal tax rate as a proxy for relative tax burdens.  
Finally, lower costs are a prime motivator of resource-seeking investments. We proxy labor costs 
by per capita GDP in U.S. dollars.
9 
  Hausman (1978) specification tests indicate that a random effects specification is 
appropriate in our analysis, and thus the next section reports random-effects estimates.
10 Ideally, 
                                                 
9 There is some ambiguity in what this variable is actually measuring. To the extent that per capita GDP measures 
economic development, a potential attraction for market seeking FDI, the model would tend to produce a coefficient 
with a positive rather than negative sign.  
10 The equations were estimated using fixed effects as well. The results were qualitatively similar.   12 
 
we would want to examine the time series properties of FDI flows for countries and establish 
whether or not we need to control for serial correlation.  Although the short span of the series  
precludes a formal analysis, visual observation of the data does not suggest that serial correlation 
is a problem.    
 
5.  Empirical Results 
5.1   Tax  variables 
  Table 5 reports estimation results for four alternative specifications of the basic regression 
model discussed in section 4.  The first column provides results from a parsimonious 
specification (model 1), using the number of special tax rates (Rates) as the sole complexity 
variable.  Models 2 and 3 include two additional measures of complexity and uncertainty: Lines 
and Vague.  We also include five additional control variables in model 3.  Model 4 is similar to 
model 3 except we include the complexity and uncertainty variables Chgs and Oppchgs in place 
of Lines and Vague. Results from these four specifications suggest that tax complexity and 
uncertainty are significant deterrents to FDI.
11   
  The coefficient on the number of special tax rates is negative and statistically significant at 
the 95 percent confidence level, and the point estimates are robust across alternative 
specifications.  This implies that the imposition of an additional special tax rate reduces FDI as a 
percent of GDP in these countries by about 0.5 percentage points, on average. 
 The  variable  Lines, which measures the length of the tax base description, is positive and 
significant in both specifications (models 2 and 3).  Although this result appears to counter the 
hypothesis of the negative effect of tax complexity on FDI flows, one possible interpretation is 
that it confirms the tension policy makers face in trying to balance complexity and precision in 
                                                 
11 We also evaluated the models with our tax complexity and uncertainty variables lagged one period, but found no 
results that were qualitatively (or quantitatively in any significant sense) different from those we found using current 
values.  13 
 
tax design.  More lines in tax legislation may represent more precision rather than more 
complexity, and we argue that it does.  In our estimation, additional precision, as measured by an 
additional line in the tax base description, leads to an increase in FDI as a percent of GDP of 
0.23 – 0.25 percentage points.   
  As expected, the coefficients on Vague were negative, but only marginally significant in 
one case (model 2) and statistically insignificant in the other (model 3).  The magnitude of the 
coefficient in model 2 is quite large, however, suggesting that ambiguity in the tax law as we 
measure it (value of Vague is 1) would reduce the ratio of FDI to GDP by a substantial 
1.5 percentage points relative to the case where there is clarity in the tax law (value of Vague 
is 0). 
  Finally, the results from model 4 suggest that consistent patterns of tax rate changes (in the 
sense that changes are in a consistent direction) stimulate FDI, but that tax rate changes in 
opposing directions repel FDI.  By our estimation, a change in tax rates in an opposite direction 
leads to a substantial 1.5 percentage point decline in FDI/GDP (0.79 – 2.29).
12  
  The coefficient for the profits tax rate had its expected negative sign, implying that higher 
tax rates lead to lower inflows of FDI, but in one case (model 3) the parameter value was not 
statistically different from zero.  By our calculation, an increase in the top tax rate from, say, 
20 percent to 30 percent would lead to a 1.2 percentage point decline in FDI/GDP. 
  Given that the mean value of FDI/GDP across the countries and time period of our analysis 
is only 2.84 percent (Table 4), our estimates of the effects of tax complexity and uncertainty on 
FDI/GDP, which range from 0.23 percentage points to 1.5 percentage points, are very 
substantial.  For the average country in the average year, an additional special tax rate would 
reduce the FDI/GDP ratio from 2.84 to 2.34, while a reversal of the trend in tax rate changes (a 
change in the opposite direction) would lead to a 51 percent decrease in the ratio, from 2.84 to 
1.34.  This represents the same impact on FDI/GDP that we estimate would result from an 
                                                 
12 It should be noted that, with the exception of one country, Russia, all countries experiencing consistent changes 
experienced consistently downward changes.  14 
 
increase in the highest profits tax rate of 12.5 percentage points, say from the average 31% to 
43.5%.  Our analysis suggests that these transition economies, if they are interested in increasing 
FDI flows relative to the size of their economies, would do well to design a simple tax system 
where tax liabilities can be gauged with some certainty. 
 
5.2 Additional  Factors 
  The various non-tax factors included in the regression equations proved for the most part to 
be significant influences on FDI/GDP in these countries, and the parameter estimates were very 
robust across alternative specifications. The coefficients of variables drawn from standard FDI 
theory were largely as expected, although not all were measured with significance. We found 
that oil-and-gas-producing nations (Gas) had significantly larger FDI-to-GDP ratios than non-
oil-and-gas-producing nations. The average value of FDI/GDP in these nations was higher by a 
large 4.1 and 8.0 percentage points. The degree of openness in the economy (Open) was found to 
be a positive influence on FDI/GDP although its effect was not as large. An increase in imports 
or exports as a percentage of GDP of 10% would increase FDI/GDP by 0.2 – 0.3 percentage 
points. The rate of economic growth (Growth), and the existence of a border with an EU nation 
(Border) did not seem to have significant effects on FDI/GDP.  
  We were initially uncertain about the likely sign of Per Cap GDP. The variable came out to 
be negative and significant, with parameter estimates ranging from – 0.44 to – 0.78.  The 
negative sign suggests that this variable is serving as a proxy for labor costs rather than market 
size, which would have probably resulted in a positive parameter value. 
  Turning to our variables measuring success in efforts toward market reform and economic 
stability, the rate of inflation was found to be negatively related to FDI/GDP. Higher rates of 
inflation have a significantly negative impact on FDI, which suggests that macroeconomic 
stability is an important factor in explaining the pattern of FDI across the former communist 
countries. The average rate of depreciation in exchange rates (ExRate) did not seem to have 
significant effects on FDI/GDP. Also, surprisingly, Transition, a broad measure of progress in  15 
 
economic and institutional reforms, was statistically insignificant in all of the models in which it 
was included as a regressor. We expected the coefficient on this variable to have been strongly 
positive and significant, and we  suggest that our result may reflect Transition’s relatively high 
collinearity with other regressors, specifically Rates, Chgs, Per Cap GDP, and inflation.
13 
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
The countries of ECE and the FSU have been undergoing monumental changes in every 
aspect of their society and economy. Reforming the tax structure, which is both an important tool 
for policy and a reflection of ideology, has deservedly occupied substantial attention in that 
process.  Over the last decade the 24 countries studied in this paper have chosen various paths in 
terms of tax law.  The question we address is whether these choices have had an impact on 
business activity through complexity and uncertainty.  In particular, we examine whether 
complex and uncertain tax structures have reduced the magnitude of foreign direct investment.  
Our results suggest that a greater number of special provisions and ambiguities in the tax law 
have indeed had such an impact.   
The results suggest that, in the transition economies, more complex and vaguely worded 
legislation negatively impact on the decisions of firms. This may be due to high compliance costs 
or simply because it adds to the already high level of uncertainty in that region. Tax complexity 
may be especially problematic in countries with underdeveloped tax administration which are ill-
equipped to clarify and communicate appropriate interpretations of the existing legislation. As 
tax administrations improve some of these problems with legislation may lessen.  
Tax law develops out of a process which seeks to balance conflicting goals, including 
efficiency, equity, growth, and minimal administrative and compliance costs, among others.  
                                                 
13 The correlation coefficients, all of which are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level, are – 0.70, 
– 0.63, 0.65, and – 0.86, respectively.    16 
 
Unfortunately, optimal taxes from a theoretical efficiency perspective, which may imply a whole 
array of different tax rates, may be significantly suboptimal from an administrative/compliance 
cost perspective.
14 A tax code altered to reflect the desire for economic growth and development 
in general, and FDI in particular, is likely to raise administrative and compliance burdens via 
increased complexity and uncertainty in the law.  
Given the evidence we have presented and analyzed, it is not at all clear that policy 
makers are aware of and fully recognize the costs of complexity and uncertainty in their 
deliberations on tax policy.  Our results have strong implications for these policymakers as they 
continue to reform their tax systems.  Although complaints about complexity in tax systems are 
replete, our results show that one must be discerning in how one discusses complexity.  Multiple 
rates and vague language can impose costs on firms and deter business activity.  However, a 
shorter tax code does not necessarily imply a better business environment.  If more extensive and 
detailed tax law provides more precision, it may actually encourage business activity by reducing 
uncertainty and transactions costs associated with determining tax liability. 
Our results also confirm the importance of macroeconomic stability in conjunction with 
such microeconomic variables as tax design and labor costs on firm decisions on foreign direct 
investment. 
Naturally, we are limited by the availability of published data and by our intent to 
develop objective measures.  Additional information, for example on the costs of compliance, on 
whether changes in tax rates were planned, and on the effectiveness of tax administration, would 
enhance our ability to assess the costs of complexity and uncertainty.   
                                                 
 
14 Optimal taxes from an efficiency perspective may be suboptimal from an equity perspective as well. The standard 
result from the optimal commodity taxation literature, for example, suggests that efficiency is maximized when each 
commodity has a unique rate of taxation that is proportional to the inverse price elasticity.  Vertical equity is 
substantially undermined by this rule, however, as necessities are by their nature highly price and income inelastic, 
while luxuries are by their nature highly price and income elastic.   17 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Alm, James (1996).  “What is an Optimal Tax System,” National Tax Journal, 49 (1), pp. 117-
33. 
 
American Chamber of Commerce in Russia (1994).  "Major Issues Affecting Investment in the 
Russian Federation," White Paper, December. 
 
Auerbach, Alan J. (1979).  “The Optimal Taxation of Heterogeneous Capital,” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 93, pp. 589-612. 
 
Auerbach, Alan J. and James R. Hines, Jr. (1987).  “Anticipated Tax Changes and the Timing of 
Investment,” in Martin Feldstein (Ed.), The Effects of Taxation on Capital Accumulation.  
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, pp. 163-200. 
 
Auerbach, Alan J. and James R. Hines, Jr. (1988).  “Investment Tax Incentives and Frequent Tax 
Reforms,” American Economic Review, 78 (2), pp. 211-16. 
 
Bagchi, Amaresh, Richard Bird, and Arindam das-Gupta (1995).  “An Economic Approach to 
Tax Administration Reform,” International Centre for Tax Studies, University of 
Toronto, Toronto, CA. 
 
Barthold, Thomas A., Thomas Koerner, and John F. Navratil (1998).  “Effective Marginal Tax 
Rates Under the Federal Individual Income Tax: Death by One Thousand Pin Pricks?”  
National Tax Journal, 51 (3), pp. 553-64. 
 
Bevan, Alan A. and Saul Estrin (2001).  “The Determinents of Foreign Direct Investment in 
Transition Economies,” working paper, Centre for New and Emerging Markets, London 
Business School, March. 
 
Bevan, Alan, Saul Estrin and Klaus Meyer (2000), “Institution Building and the Integration of 
Eastern Europe in International Production,” Centre for New and Emerging Markets 
Discussion Paper Series No. 11.  
 
Bird, Richard and Oliver Oldman, Eds. (1990).  Taxation in Developing Countries.  Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Bizer, David S. and Kenneth L. Judd (1989).  “Taxation and Uncertainty,” American Economic 
Review, 79 (2), pp. 331-36. 
 
Blumenthal, Marsha and Joel Slemrod (1992).  “The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Tax System: 
A Second Look After Tax Reform,” National Tax Journal, 45 (2), pp. 185-
202.Broadway, Robin W. and Anwar Shah (1995).  “Perspectives on the Role of 
Investment Incentives in Developing Countries,” in Shah (1995a). 
 
Christian, Charles W., Sanjay Gupta, and Suming Lin (1993).  “Determinants of Tax Preparer 
Usage: Evidence from Panel Data,” National Tax Journal, 46 (4), pp. 487-503. 
 
Dotsey, Michael (1990).  “The Economic Effects of Production Taxes in a Stochastic Growth 
Model,” American Economic Review, 80 (5), pp. 1168-82. 
 
  18 
 
Edmiston, Kelly D. (2002).  “Tax Uncertainty and Investment: A Cross-Country Empirical 
Examination,” working paper, Department of Economics, Andrew Young School of 
Policy Studies, Georgia State University, July. 
 
Edmiston, Kelly D., Shannon B. Mudd, and Neven T. Valev (2001).  “Incentive Targeting, 
Influence Peddling, and Foreign Direct Investment,” working paper, Department of 
Economics, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, July. 
 
Erard, Brian (1993).  “Taxation with Representation: An Analysis of the Role of Tax 
Practitioners in Tax Compliance,” Journal of Public Economics, 52 (2), pp. 163-97. 
 
Estache, Antonio and Vitor Gaspar (1995).  “Why Tax Incentives Do Not Promote Investment in 
Brazil,” in Shah (1995a). 
 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (1995).  Transition Report 1995: 
Investment and Enterprise Development.  London, UK: EBRD. 
 
______ (1999) Transition Report 1999: Investment and Enterprise Development.  London, UK: 
EBRD. 
 
Hassett, Kevin A. and Gilbert E. Metcalf (1999).  “Investment with Uncertain Tax Policy: Does 
Random Tax Policy Discourage Investment?”  Economic Journal, 109 (457), pp. 372-93. 
 
Heyndels, Bruno and Carine Smolders (1995).  “Tax Complexity and Fiscal Illusion,” Public 
Choice, 85 (1-2), pp. 127-41. 
 
Holland, Dawn and Nigel Pain (1998), “The Diffusion of Innovations in Central and Eastern 
Europe: A Study of the Determinants and Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment,” 
National Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 137. 
 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (1993 - 1998).   Central and East European Tax 
Directory.  Amsterdam: IBFD Publications. 
 
Jun, Joosung (1994).   "How Taxation Affects Foreign Direct Investment (Country-specific 
Evidence)," World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1307, June. 
 
Kaplow, Louis (1990).  “Optimal Taxation with Optimal Enforcement and Evasion,” Journal of 
Public Economics, 43 (2), pp. 221-36. 
 
Kaplow, Louis (1995).  “How Tax Complexity and Enforcement Affect the Equity and 
Efficiency of the Income Tax,” National Tax Journal, 49 (2), pp. 135-50. 
 
Kushnirsky, Fydor I. (2001).  “A Modification of the Production Function for Transition 
Economies Reflecting the Role of Institutional Factors,” Comparative Economic Studies, 
43 (1), pp. 1-30. 
 
Long, James E. and Steven B. Caudill (1987).  “The Usage and Benefits from Paid Tax Return 
Preparation,” National Tax Journal, 40 (1), pp. 35-46. 
 
Mayshar, Joram (1991).  “Taxation with Costly Administration,” Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics, 93 (1), pp. 75-88. 
 
Meyer, Klaus (1998).  Direct Foreign Investment in Economies in Transition.  Cheltanham, UK: 
Edward Elgar.  19 
 
 
Meyer, Klaus (2001).  “Institutions, Transaction Costs, and Entry Mode Choice in Eastern 
Europe,” Journal of International Business Studies, 32 (2), pp. 357-67. 
 
Mudd, Shannon (1996).  "An Analysis of Tax Incentive for Investment Promotion," unpublished 
memorandum prepared for the Russian Federation Duma. 
 
OECD (1995).  Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: The Experience of the Economies in 
Transition.  Paris: OECD. 
 
Pope, Jeff and Richard Fayle (1990). ”The Compliance Costs of Personal Income Taxation in 
Australia 1986/87: Empirical Results,” Australian Tax Forum, 7 (1), pp. 85-126.    
 
Ramcharran, Harri (2000), “Foreign Direct Investments in Central and Eastern Europe: An 
Analysis of Regulatory and Country Risk,” American Business Review v. 18 no. 1. 
 
Rosen, Harvey S. (1999).  Public Finance, 5
th Edition.  Boston, MA: Irwin McGraw-Hill. 
 
Sanford, Cedric T. (1973).  Hidden Costs of Taxation.  London, UK: Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
 
Sanford, Cedric T., Ed. (1995). Tax Compliance Costs: Measurement and Policy.  Bath, UK: 
Fiscal Publications. 
 
Sanford, Cedric T., Michael Godwin, and Peter Hardwick (1989).  Administrative and 
Compliance Costs of Taxation.  Bath, UK: Fiscal Publications. 
 
Schaffer, Mark and Gerard Turley, (2001) “Effective versus Statutory Taxation: Measuring 
Effective Tax Administration in Transition Economies,“ European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development Working Paper no. 62. 
 
Schenk, Deborah H. (2001).  “Old Wine in Old Bottles: Simplification of Family Status Tax 
Issues,” Tax Notes, 91 (9, Special Supplement), May 28, pp. 1437-53. 
 
Shah, Anwar, ed.,  (1995a).  Fiscal Incentives for Investment and Innovation.  Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 
 
Shah, Anwar (1995b).  “Overview,” in Shah (1995a). 
 
Shaviro, Daniel (2001).  “Tax Simplification and the Alternative Minimum Tax,” Tax Notes, 91 
(9, Special Supplement), May 28, pp. 1455-68. 
 
Slemrod, Joel (1990).  “Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 4 (1), pp. 157-78. 
 
Slemrod, Joel and Nikki Sorum (1984).  “The Compliance Cost of the U.S. individual Income 
Tax System,” National Tax Journal, 37 (4), pp. 461-74. 
 
Slemrod, Joel and Jon Bakija (1996).  Taxing Ourselves: A Citizens Guide to the Great Debate 
Over Tax Reform.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.   
 
Slemrod, Joel and Marsha Blumenthal (1996).  “The Income Tax Compliance Cost of Big 
Business,” Public Finance Quarterly, 24 (4), pp. 411-38. 
  20 
 
Smith, William T. (1996).  “Taxes, Uncertainty, and Long-Term Growth,” European Economic 
Review, 40 (8), pp. 1647-64. 
 
Thorton. Judith and Nadezhda N. Mikheeva (1996).  “The Strategies of Foreign and Foreign-
Assisted Firms in the Russian Far East: Alternatives to Missing Infrastructure,” 
Comparative Economic Studies, 38(4), pp. 85-120. 
 
United States Internal Revenue Service, Annual Report from the Commissioner of the Internal 
Revenue Service on Tax Form Complexity, Washington, DC, June 5, 2000. 
 
Vaillancourt, François (1986).  The Administrative and Compliance Costs of the Personal 
Income Tax and Payroll Tax System in Canada, 1986.  Toronto, CA: Canadian Tax 
Foundation. 
 
Wagner, Richard E. (1976).  “Revenue Structure, Fiscal Illusion, and Budgetary Choice,” Public 
Choice, 25 (1), pp. 45-61. 
 
Warskett, George, Stanley Winer and Walter Hettich, (1998). “The Complexity of Tax Structure 
in Competitive Political Systems,” International Tax and Public Finance, 5, pp. 123-151. 
 
Wicks, John H. (1966).  “Taxpayer Compliance Costs from Personal Income Taxation,” Iowa 
Business Digest, August, pp. 16-21. 
 
Wicks, John H. and Michael N. Killworth (1967).  “Administrative and Compliance Costs of 
State and Local Taxes,” National Tax Journal, 20 (3), pp. 309-15. 
 
Willis, Arthur B. (1969).  Studies in Substantive Tax Reform.  Chicago, IL: American Bar 
Association.  21 
 
 
Table 1  
Number of different tax rates and the highest statutory marginal tax rate 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
1993-98 
Number of different tax rates 
 
Highest Statutory Profits Tax Rate 
Country 
  Period 
average  1993 1998  Changes  Period 
average  1993 1997  Changes 
Albania  2.00 2  0  ↑↓  30  30  30  - 
Armenia  3.00 2  1  ↑↓  28  30  25  ↓ 
Azerbaijan  3.17 6  1  ↓↓  33  35  30  ↓ 
Belarus  4.67 4  5  ↑  30  30  30  - 
Bulgaria  1.83 2  1  -  36  40  27  ↓↓ 
Croatia  0.00 0  0  -  30  25  35  ↑ 
Czech Rep.  0.67 0  1  ↑  39  42  35  ↓↓↓ 
Estonia  1.00  1 1  - 26  26  26 - 
Georgia  1.17 0  1 ↑↓↓  24  32  20  ↓ 
Hungary  1.00 1  1  -  23  36  18  ↓↓ 
Kazakhstan  2.50 3  3 ↓↑↑  30  30  30  - 
Kyrgyz Rep.  3.00 6  0  ↓  33  35  30  ↓ 
Latvia  1.00 3  0  ↓  28  35  25  ↓ 
Lithuania 1.00  1 1  - 29  29  29 - 
Macedonia  0.00    0 - 15  15  
Moldova  2.00 3  0  ↓  32  32  32  - 
Poland  0.00 0  0  -  38  40  34  ↓↓ 
Romania  2.00 0  2 ↑↑↓  39  45  38  ↓ 
Russian Fed.  3.83 2  5  ↑↑  34  35  30  - 
Slovak  Rep.  0.17  0 1  - 40  40  40 - 
Slovenia  0.00 0  0  -  27  30  25  ↓ 
Tajikistan  3.33 6  2  ↓↓  40  45  30  ↓↑↓ 
Turkmenistan  3.50 4  3 ↓↑↓  25  25  25  - 
Ukraine  3.17 6  1 ↓↑↓  29  22  30  ↑ 
Uzbekistan  4.17 5  4  ↓↓  33  18  33  ↑↓↓ 
Average 1.92  2.4  1.3    31  32.8  28.8   
Source:  IBFD, Central and East European Tax Directory, various years. 
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Table 2  
Number of lines describing the tax base and indefinite language in the tax law  
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
1993-98 
Indefinite language  Number of lines describing the tax base  Country 
  Period 
average  1993 1998  Period 
average  1993 1998 
Albania  0.70        0.7          0.7  7.6          8          6 
Armenia  0.67        1.0  0.0  6.8          6  11 
Azerbaijan 0.20  0.3  0.0  10.6  9  11 
Belarus 1.00  1.0  1.0  9.8  9  10 
Bulgaria 1.00  1.0  1.0  12.3  10  13 
Croatia 1.00  1.0  1.0  8.1  6  9 
Czech Rep.  0.70  0.7 0.7  10.5 7 16 
Estonia 0.17  1.0  0.0  5.6  5  6 
Georgia 0.75   0.0  7.0    7 
Hungary 0.43  0.7  0.3  13.3  11  16 
Kazakhstan  0.33  1.0          1.0  6.3  9  7 
Kyrgyz Rep.  0.60  1.0  0.0  7.4  9  6 
Latvia 0.00  0.0  0.0  6.6  8  6 
Lithuania 0.27  0.3  1.0  7.0 6 8 
Macedonia 1.00   1.0  8.0   8 
Moldova 1.00  1.0  1.0  5.0    
Poland 0.15  0.0  0.3  8.8  7  10 
Romania 0.50  1.0  0.0  7.8  6  12 
Russian Fed.  1.00  1.0  1.0  12.1  12  12 
Slovak Rep.  0.75  0.7  0.7  8.0  8  8 
Slovenia 0.05  0.3  0.0  7.6  9  7 
Tajikistan 1.00  1.0 1.0  12.1  12  13 
Turkmenistan 1.00  1.0  1.0  6.0  6  6 
Ukraine 0.80  1.0  0.7  8.0  7  11 
Uzbekistan 1.00  1.0  1.0  8.0  8  8 
Average  0.64         0.8          0.6  8.4  8.1  9.5 
Source:  IBFD, Central and East European Tax Directory, various years 
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Table 3 
Foreign Direct Investment as percent of GDP 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
1993-98 
Foreign Direct Investment as percent of GDP  Country 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998  Average 
Albania  4.75 2.67 2.89 3.41 1.95 1.50 2.86 
Armenia    0.34 0.48 1.10 3.13 7.60 2.53 
Azerbaijan    0.60  7.86  16.46 28.40 26.20 15.91 
Belarus  0.04 0.08 0.11 0.37 1.40 0.70 0.45 
Bulgaria  0.51 1.08 0.69 1.11 4.80 2.80 1.83 
Croatia  0.82 0.80 0.56 1.00 2.90    1.22 
Czech Rep.  2.10  2.20  5.05 2.54 2.47 4.50 3.14 
Estonia  4.04 5.31 4.21 3.44 2.80  10.40  5.03 
Georgia    0.23 0.26 0.87 3.60 4.30 1.85 
Hungary  6.09 2.76  10.12  4.39 3.70 3.60 5.11 
Kazakhstan 0.58 0.93 4.84 5.40 5.96 5.90 3.94 
Kyrgyz  Rep.  0.23 1.19 2.89 2.58 4.90 3.10 2.48 
Latvia  0.85 3.93 2.87 7.44 9.30 3.20 4.60 
Lithuania  0.50 0.54 1.05 1.93 3.40 9.20 2.77 
Macedonia  1.28  0.67 0.36 0.90 3.70 1.38 
Moldova    0.44 0.75 1.46 2.90 5.80 2.27 
Poland  1.99 2.03 3.08 3.34 2.20 4.50 2.86 
Romania  0.36 1.22 1.28 0.84 3.49 4.70 1.98 
Russian  Fed.    0.20 0.58 0.58 0.80 0.30 0.49 
Slovak  Rep.  1.66 1.47 1.05 1.50 0.40 1.20 1.21 
Slovenia  0.89 0.89 0.94 0.98 1.60 0.80 1.02 
Tajikistan    0.48 0.90 0.80 2.70 1.00 1.18 
Turkmenistan       5.90  5.20  5.55 
Ukraine    0.17 0.31 1.17 1.20 1.70 0.91 
Uzbekistan 0.20 0.24 0.51 0.23 1.20 1.20 0.60 
Average  1.60 1.29 2.25 2.77 4.05 4.69 2.83 
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report, various year .  
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Table 4 
Data Descriptions, Sources, and Sample Statistics 
Variable Description  Source  Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
FDI/GDP  Foreign direct investment 
as a share of GDP 
EBRD Transition Report 
(various years) 
2.840 
(3.912) 
Rates  Number of special tax rates 
Author constructed from 
IBFD Central and East 
European Tax Directory 
1.966 
(1.892) 
Lines  Number of lines in tax base 
description 
Author constructed from 
IBFD Central and East 
European Tax Directory 
8.640 
(2.723) 
Vague  Ambiguous language in tax 
law 
Author constructed from 
IBFD Central and East 
European Tax Directory 
0.634 
(0.423) 
Chgs  Number of changes in tax 
rates 
Author constructed from 
IBFD Central and East 
European Tax Directory 
3.352 
(1.931) 
OppChgs  Number of tax rate changes 
in opposing directions 
Author constructed from 
IBFD Central and East 
European Tax Directory 
0.717 
(0.918) 
Tax  Highest marginal profits 
tax rate 
IBFD Central and East 
European Tax Directory 
(various years) 
31.109 
(6.471) 
Transition 
Principle components 
aggregate of EBRD’s (8) 
Progress in Transition 
Indicators  
EBRD Transition Report 
(various years) 
0.397 
(2.250) 
Inflation  Log inflation  EBRD Transition Report 
(various years) 
4.047 
(2.013) 
Per Cap GDP  GDP per capita  
(Thousands of US$) 
EBRD Transition Report 
(various years) 
2,071 
(1,846) 
Gas 
Dummy variable with 
value 1 if producer of 
natural gas 
Author constructed  0.200 
(0.401) 
Open  Imports + exports as a 
percent of GDP 
WB World Development 
Indicators, 2001 
91.988 
(30.952) 
Growth  Percentage change in GDP 
from previous year 
WB World Development 
Indicators, 2001 
- 1.059 
(8.440) 
ExRate 
Average rate of 
depreciation in exchange 
rate 
WB World Development 
Indicators, 2001 
1.225 
(1.635) 
Border 
Dummy variable with 
value 1 if borders an EU 
member country 
Author constructed  0.440 
(0.498)  25 
 
 
Table 5 
Tax structure and FDI. 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
1993-98 
Dependent variable: Annual inflows of Foreign Direct 
Investment as percent of GDP 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of special tax rates (Rates)  -0.49*** 
(0.17) 
-0.46** 
(0.21) 
-0.54** 
(0.22) 
-0.50*** 
(0.19) 
Number of lines in tax base description 
(Lines)    0.25** 
(0.11) 
0.23* 
(0.12)   
Ambiguous language in tax law (Vague)   -1.51* 
(0.81) 
-0.87 
(0.89)   
Number of changes in tax parameters 
(Chgs)      0.79* 
(0.41) 
Number of changes in opposing 
direction  (Oppchgs)      -2.29** 
(0.90) 
Real per capita GDP in thousands US$ 
(Per cap GDP) 
-0.44 
(0.27) 
-0.66*** 
(0.22) 
-0.66*** 
(0.29) 
-0.72** 
(0.30) 
Imports plus exports as percent of GDP 
(Open) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
Gas   5.10*** 
(1.50) 
4.68*** 
(1.13) 
4.41*** 
(1.31) 
3.53*** 
(1.40) 
Logarithm of annual percentage changes 
in the CPI (Inflation) 
-0.95*** 
(0.15) 
-0.91*** 
(0.17) 
-0.89*** 
(0.26) 
-0.97*** 
(0.24) 
A principal component of EBRD 
transition indexes (Transition)     0.01 
(0.31) 
0.04 
(0.28) 
Percentage change in real per capita 
GDP (Growth)     0.02 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
Exchange rate changes 
(ExRate)     0.28 
(0.36) 
0.55 
(0.36) 
Profits tax rate  
(Tax)     -0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.12* 
(0.06) 
Border      0.26 
(1.51) 
-0.01 
(1.48) 
Constant   4.77 
(1.58) 
4.06 
(1.71) 
5.65 
(3.05) 
7.99 
(2.86) 
Overall R
2  
(R
2 within )   
0.33 
(0.36) 
0.43 
(0.35) 
0.46 
(0.37) 
0.48 
(0.37) 
Number of observations  131 123 120 128 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses. ***(**,*) indicate significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
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